The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent awareness of terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction had a significant impact on the European security arena. Europe needed to review its strategy in order to respond adequately to the security challenges ahead. Hence, the 2003 European Security Strategy was formulated around the post-9/11 security environment, identifying the key security challenges and the subsequent political implications for the EU. Today, thirteen years after the first document was drafted, Europe seems to be more vulnerable and insecure than ever before. Indeed, Europe faces a plethora of security threats, different in nature, cause and treatment, such as its economic downturn, the rise of the Islamic State and its terrorist operations in European soil, the spread of European jihadists, Europe's migration crisis, Russia's aggressive policy, the war in neighbouring Ukraine, and the rise of nationalistic and xenophobic forces inside Europe itself. This dangerous situation has not only put at risk the key European values of solidarity, trust and unity among Member States, but also the European project itself. Thus, an ambitious European strategy that can guarantee the EU's internal and external security over the coming years, based on unity, solidarity and integration seems more urgent than ever before. After 9/11, Tony Blair was distinguished as the leader with the most controversial political stand among all Europeans. Blair responded to the events by further elaborating his doctrine of international community, defending a progressive view of the world starting from the reality of interdependence in the age of globalisation, and acting according to certain values, equal to strategic interests. It is through his controversial practicing of leadership that this work shall draw a series of lessons on what to avoid and what to seek next time, mainly regarding Europe's strategic words and actions.
Introduction
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 9/11 marked the beginning of a new era in International Relations. Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) appear more threatening than ever before. For Blair, we are living in a world of low predictability where global challenges require global responses. The role of the European Union (EU) in the world has to be redefined, decisions have to be taken and answers over Europe's security and defence policy have to be provided.
The Iraq War in 2003 did not stop terrorism. The subsequent terrorist attacks on European soil: London, Madrid, Paris and more recently in Brussels proved that terrorism is far from over.
Under this prism, the current work analyses the post-9/11 security environment and the birth of a strategic culture, mainly the creation of the first European Security Strategy (ESS) and Blair's doctrine and political involvement as the most controversial political leader at that time. It seeks to draw some specific conclusions over the urgency and the necessity of Europe's union and integration in order to tackle the current security threats and challenges in the most effective way possible.
Given the massive changes in the European security environment since 2003, and the limitations of the ESS, the present analysis argues in favour of a more ambitious European approach, focusing on union and further political and institutional integration. The methodology is basically empirical. First of all, the present work weighs claims and facts, seeking answers to the following research questions:
 How have the dominant threat perceptions across Europe changed after 9/11?  What is distinctive in Blair's policy?  What are Europe's main weaknesses concerning its external strategy?  Why does the new strategy have to be ambitious?
The work analyses thus the nature of the 2003 ESS and its 2008 review, evaluating the successes and limits of these documents, under the light of the changing European security scene. The post-9/11 political adventurisms and Blair's doctrine serve as a guide on EU's next steps. Courage and leadership will be needed.
The European Security Strategy: The Document

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities (European Council 2003).
The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy in December 2003 as a way to deal with the complex, multifaceted and more dangerous security environment of the 21 st century, fortified by globalisation. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based on its common core values of respect for liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights and dignity. Europe's strategy is mainly based on three objectives:
Extending the Security Zone around Europe
The ESS aims to build security in its neighbourhood, by extending the benefits of social and economic cooperation as stabilisation factors and as used in the Balkans to the benefit of its Eastern neighbours such as Ukraine and Moldova. The EU has to be engaged in the Mediterranean area, and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a strategic priority for the EU.
Establishing Effective Multilateralism Based on the UN
EU's other objective is an effective multilateral system, with functioning international institutions and a rule based on international order. On this basis, the UN and the transatlantic partnership are key words in the document. The ESS also reaffirms the need for the EU to become involved in the world scene in a preventive way and to act when the rules are violated.
Responding to the Global Threats
The EU needs to respond to the global threats by recognising that the traditional form of defence belongs to the past. Indeed, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, for almost half a century, major world powers entrusted the security of their nation to a balance of power among states. But today, the first line of defence lays abroad (Howorth 2007) . The ESS formulates some specific political priorities for meeting this objective, such as a more active, more capable, more coherent attitude and work with its partners. Accordingly, the ESS is divided into three sections.
The first section deals with the global security environment and acknowledges the mixed perceptions of globalisation that exists. On this basis, it identifies five key threats: terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, failed states, organised crime, and regional conflicts. The second section outlines the European Union's strategic objectives:
"building security in the European region and creating a viable new international order. There are two statements included in the document that reflect the change in European security philosophy after 9/11: the first line of defence will often be abroad, primarily via conflict prevention; and the statement that none of the new threats are purely military or manageable through purely military means" (The European Security Strategy 2003: 6 -7). The EU's comprehensive neighbourhood policy is focused on building security in the European region by developing a circle of friends from the Caucasus to the Balkans and around the Mediterranean. On the other hand, by creating a viable new international order, the EU seeks to develop international law, based on the UN's support (Gowan 2007) . But most importantly, the most innovative aspect of this section is the emphasis on using the European Union's powerful trade and development policies in a conditional, integrated, and targeted way. This seems to imply that the EU recognises its powerful assets and is keen to use them in an efficient and effective way.
The final section of the ESS addresses the political priorities for the EU. The EU needs to be a more dynamic, more consistent, and more capable player (European Council 2003, 11) . One of the statements of the document, which guaranteed a US approval, asserts the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters an early, rapid, and, where necessary, a more robust intervention.
It is claimed that the ESS will contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer and safer world. The document itself inevitably constitutes something of a compromise between different cultures and approaches among EU Member States. But how did all the Member States of the EU finally mutually agree on such a security strategy? There have been three key reasons:
Firstly, a joint security strategy aims to move the EU into the post-9/11 security environment and to advance Europe's economic and political interests. The EU Strategy aspires to go beyond mere soft power and to get real, developing its own hard power to defend its interests and its population (Van Ham 2004) . EU Member States still recognise that in our era, an era of globalization, distant threats may be of as much concern as those that are near at hand, and that in some cases a more robust intervention may be unavoidable. The document also calls for a more preventive engagement, but without clear indications as to when the use of military force may be considered legitimate to prevent for example a WMD-proliferation or humanitarian emergencies.
The EU agreed on a joint strategy, aiming to repair the damaged transatlantic relationship, caused by the Iraq war, and to provide Europe's continued relevance to the US security agenda (Balla 2015) . To that end, the EU document opens with the remark that the United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, and closes with the statement acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world (Balla 2015) . This is the belief of all EU Member States and the message is that Europe with its global political ambitions does not challenge the US, but instead aims to position itself as a strategic partner. The document thus states that the EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular the Berlin Plus which allows the EU to draw on some of NATO's military assets in its own peacekeeping operations, shall tackle the challenges of the new century. The document also accepts a world of well-governed democratic states, in accordance with the conceptual underpinnings of the US administration's worldview, yet, in a really diplomatic tone (Biscop 2007) . The ESS document also aimed to ease disagreements inside the EU over the Iraq case. On 20 March 2003, the United States together with the United Kingdom launched military operations against Iraq. This move divided Europe into two camps, the supporters of the Iraqi operation (Spain, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the accession candidates Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland) and the opponents (mainly, France and Germany). Hence, the ESS came as a success to some extent for the EU's capacity to take decisions even in troubled times.
The Security Strategy, drafted at a time of deep divisions amongst Member States in the aftermath of the launch of the 2003 Iraq War and in a pre-Lisbon Treaty and pre-2004 enlargement environment, may not have been able to solve the EU's strategic problems nor the transatlantic relationship faults. It has been, however, a necessary step in the slow process towards the EU's conceptual growth.
The European Security Strategy and the European Security and Defence Policy
As far as the European Security and Defence Policy 1 are concerned, it did not receive a specific strategic concept by the ESS. In the context of the time of its adoption, the ESS aimed at stating the EU's ambition of becoming a global player and for setting out a rule-based concept of international relations guided mainly by humanitarian drives. It also forms an answer to the American National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted in 2002, almost a year before, demonstrating in many ways an opposition to the unilateral and interventionist preferences presented by the US neoconservative document. The EU's contribution to global governance is based on multilateralism, using force only as a very last resort. For the EU, even the fight against international terrorism is a task involving a full spectrum of instruments, including not only military but a series of non-military instruments as well (Bailes 2008) . The ESS suggests on the part of the EU to take more responsibility for the security of its citizens. Accordingly, the Petersburg tasks were expanded so that the military missions deployed by the EU could now include disarmament operations as well as support for third countries in combating terrorism and reforming their security sectors.
2 However, the text itself touches only superficially upon the issue of mutual defence, and the ESDP is limited to crisis management and conflict prevention. Therefore, the limitations of the ESS can also be explained by the particular circumstances of its genesis.
In the European document also remains a certain lack of coherence over a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. A majority of EU Member States still prefer NATO to Europe as a distinct security power. NATO's credibility is to a very large extent based on the military means of the US from which the EU Member States cannot easily distance themselves. So, the ESS failed in that sense to advance the ESDP project in real terms.
Nonetheless, the ESS forms an expression of the EU's quest for autonomous decision shaping and planning capabilities as set down in the 1999 Helsinki declaration (European Council 1999) . Consequently, the European Council agreed in December 2003 to create a civilian/military-planning cell with a view to developing an autonomous operational planning capacity. In that way, the ESS was a further step away from NATO, on whose planning capabilities the EU depended for the implementation of ESDP military missions until then. New security challenges such as environmental and energy issues, migration and new diseases may make intervention a necessity as well. Still, the question really is: are EU Member States ready to engage in major military operations under the EU flag?
In reality, it seems that the definition of a European policy is based on European interests and these diverge because Member States differ-in size, economic power and geographic and historical facts. The different national interests of the EU Member States have often placed constraints on the ESDP and continue to be a problem. So, there is a need to define a genuine list of vital interests that goes beyond such examples and takes them seriously: terrorism, WMD, failed states, conflict resolution, organised crime, energy supply, open trade routes, migration and coping with new diseases.
Under this prism, working towards an international order based on effective multilateralism makes it necessary to seek better cooperation with a number of strategic partners. The ESS mentions that We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Russia's reemergence on the world scene and China's economic dynamism are key factors for international security at the time and even more alarming today. It is clear that the relationship with Moscow following the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2005 Member States -previously belonging to the Warsaw Pact under the direct Russian influence -differ more than in the past. Given the fact that the European Union continues to be the dominant market for Russian energy exports and its geographic closeness, the EU should clarify its attitude towards its biggest neighbour. Europe needs to gain more energy independence, but bringing at the same time Russia closer as an economic and strategic partner. The Ukraine crisis and the aggressive policy of Russia in Syria have made this call more urgent than before. On this other hand, the security partnerships with traditional partners such as Japan and Canada or new ones like Brazil and India are mentioned but not well defined. And finally, the problems in Iraq were not adequately examined.
The ESS recognises globalisation challenges and a need for a global answer to them. But even though the 2003 document was indeed the first step to develop a real European strategy, it was suffering from a lack of clear prioritisation and limited input regarding implementation of its objectives.
The Review
Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the 2008 Review of the ESS started as an ambitious attempt to evaluate the changes that took place between 2003 and 2008, including the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, and drafted a new version of the document.
The signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 transformed EU institutions, and allowed the creation and development of the European External Action Service, bringing multiple international tools available to the EU closer under the leadership of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs/VicePresident (HR/VP). In practice, however, while the EU has demonstrated leadership on several important crises as the Iranian nuclear negotiations, the Serbia and Kosovo stabilisation process, it has not yet fully taken into account as a group some of the most significant institutional developments achieved in the Lisbon Treaty. For instance, the permanent structured cooperation contained in article 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) has not been used to deepen cooperation amongst the Member States. The 2004 enlargement, on the other hand, made it more difficult to achieve consensus and to define priorities among the so dissimilar 28 Member States.
The 2008 revision ended up with just an Implementation Report on the European Security Strategy (European Council 2008a). In reality, the new document did not manage to meet its initial ambition and it did not assess the successes and effectiveness of the EU Foreign and Security Policy. In spite of some worth noticing additions to the 2003 document, as on cyber security, pandemics or climate change, and some more emphasis on better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making, and a greater engagement with our neighbourhood (on the ENP and on the partnerships for effective multilateralism), it did not fundamentally alter the limitations of the initial document with concrete actions and institutional developments. Member States seem to have reinforced the impression of a document describing the environment and listing general principles, rather than a strategic document with clear priorities and implementation measures.
According to Blair's view, the most important political changes are mental. European leaders have to understand that more unity means more capability and more influence. So, Europe has to assume its responsibilities as an important global player. And to that end, Europe's security and defence policy has to preserve a strong partnership with the US and with NATO, but at the same time it has to develop stronger military capabilities. This will permit an efficient European answer to international challenges and thus more credibility in the negotiation table.
The Blair's Doctrine
The Blair doctrine was defined in his speech in Chicago on the 22nd of April 1999. Blair's speech was delivered in the midst of the Kosovo war. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we still want to be secure (Blair 1999) . To his Chicago audience, Blair claimed that we live in a globalised, interdependent world, where problems can only be addressed by an international co-operation. States would, or at least should, respond to the increased interdependence of globalisation by defining their particular interests in terms of the wider international interest, although there was little indication of how that idea of the common good would be formulated or who would speak for it (Stephens 2004 , Kampfner 2003 . For Blair, in the end, values and interests merge. Besides, the European Union cannot become a closed fortress; it must be a force for openness.
Blair saw opportunities in the post-9/11 period. In Afghanistan, more specifically, Blair saw the implementation of progressive politics. The UK would stand shoulder-to-shoulder alongside the US, with the latter's work with the international community in defeating terrorism being considered a good thing for the security of all. The power of community, solidarity, and the communal ability to further the state's interests were at the centre of the British decisions at the time.
For Blair, America could not retreat into isolationism. America should stay engaged, as it is a great, powerful and thus responsible nation. He perceived very early that the actions of Al-Qaeda may easily set off what Huntington called the class of civilisation. Another contribution was the moral dimension to the war that was given by Blair contrary to the unconditional kind of dichotomist or you are with us or against us, promoted by the Bush administration. Yet his aim was to revive the doctrine of international community, which he had introduced at the height of the Kosovo crisis, but failed to do so. Indeed, merely Kosovo and Sierra Leone have so far confirmed Blair's belief on liberal intervention aiming to liberty from long tyrannies that massacre their own people and threatens world peace.
Although the Iraqi's endless crisis shook Blair's policy to its foundation, Blair's doctrine is not only Iraqi-based; Blair's ideology goes much further. Based on Blair's doctrine, one does find key concepts for a stronger European strategy. Europe therefore needs to be more engaged, dynamically, and, where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence. Blair's political choices were also formulated around the belief that the transatlantic unity is indispensable for meeting the new challenges of the 21st century and America is the key European partner for this to be achieved. Europe has to be a strong and trustful ally, with strong military capabilities and the political will to make a difference in the world, assuming its responsibilities, and offering primarily security to its own people.
Today, the EU is back into its strategic mode. In our globalised world, no nation is strong enough to act alone. The current challenges require union, solidarity and further integration. In the words of Blair: In a world in which China and India will each have a population three times that of the EU, anything else is completely out of date (Blair 2007) . Countries need the collective weight of the EU when dealing with global threats such as terrorism or cybercrime.
Towards a Global Strategy and Beyond
From 2008 to 2016 the Worst Nightmares
The 2008 financial crisis, the Arab Spring, the shock of Russian military adventurisms, in Georgia, Ukraine and recently in Syria, terrorism and the rise of the Islamic state and European jihadists, and the current refugee crisis have all served to destabilise the European security environment. How Europe provides for its citizens will depend on how well Europe can identify common values and interests and engage with the rest of the world to ensure that the threats are reduced and manageable.
In June 2015 the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, presented her strategic assessment of the global context to EU leaders and she was asked to prepare an EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy to guide the European Union's global actions in the future. During the last year, there have been released a series of documents, institutional reports, expert's opinions, and academic and political discourse, all pointing out to the massive changes in the European security environment since 2003, the limitations of the ESS, and the growing internal and external insecurity 3 . It is vital to strengthen the European political integration, most likely through enhanced cooperation as provided for by the Treaties, in order to revive enthusiasm for the European project, placing decision-making and democracy on the same footing.
Key Political and Institutional Recommendations
The main criticism the 2003 ESS faced was its general nature. A future document should be an opportunity to endorse concrete decisions and priorities as a security provider. The necessity of further political and institutional integration based on unity, but also on flexibility, are key factors for the elaboration of the new document and beyond.
The war in Ukraine, the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels and the refugee crisis have all proven that threats don't only move closer to the EU's borders but can easily "invade" European territory. The new strategy has to reassess the EU's neighbourhood policy, strengthening the accession path of candidate countries, particularly the Western Balkans, and stabilising the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, including by responding to terrorism and the huge flow of refugees. However, this will not be an easy task in practice as far as the EU is an international organisation composed by 28 different national interests, combining both federal and intergovernmental characteristics. An approach that shapes decisions based on the advantage in cooperating at European level, rather that returning to a nation-state mode of governance and isolation is crucial. The collective weight of the EU can guarantee protection in dealing with global pressures such as terrorism. It is through the EU that states can exchange criminal and passenger records and work resourcefully on counter-terrorism.
The Lisbon Treaty did include some institutional and political breakthroughs, but these have not worked as expected. The Treaty does give the HR/VP opportunities (either alone or supported by the Commission) to put forward proposals and initiatives and the European External Action Service (EEAS) is destined to make the process more effective. However, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are defined and implemented by the European Council, with the Council acting unanimously, thus any country can block decisions and actions based on national interests.
Furthermore, the EU has a serious leadership gap problem. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has a main jurisdiction over the Common Foreign and Security Policy; but the Permanent President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and the six-month rotating Council President and the President of the Commission also represent the EU on the world stage.
The EU must build up a more united, more flexible, and more capable security and defence. The European External Action Service can propose and implement, but it does not take decisions. The structures of the EEAS do require a fresh start. The EEAS should become a more firmly integrated service with a clearer command, in order to respond more quickly to developments, and deliver a greater initiative and leadership.
Greater flexibility should also be achieved by making full use of the tools provided for by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Constructive abstention provided by Article 31 of the Treaty on the European Union -allowing Member States to abstain in order to allow a decision to be taken by others -when dealing with CFSP and CSDP needs to be increased. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon added the possibility for Member states that are able and willing to follow through on their commitments to agree to move ahead, making use of the flexible cooperation clauses in the Treaty (such as Article 42.6, Article 43.1, Article 46 -permanent structured cooperation as we saw above, Protocol 10 of the amended Treaty on European Union). The Article 42.7 (mutual assistance) has been activated by France after the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. This move resulted in a series of bilateral consultations, followed by decisions in other European capitals to provide military and other support to France. However, conclusions could be drawn from the Art. 42.7 activation, to explore what role the EU institutions could play in the future use of the mutual assistance provision.
An increase in the EU's military capabilities is also a must. Europe needs the muscles as much as it needs the brains in order to copy with the complex perils of the 21 st century. This will require increased funding, more and better use of resources, through pooling and sharing initiatives, the promotion of large-scale joint projects -in cooperation not against NATO -and the development of the European defence industry. Indeed, so far there have been 11 EU military operations and 21 civilian missions, relatively modest in terms of the scale and level of the operations. The EU spends 40% of the amount the US spends on national defence. Today duplication among the Member States in expenditure and a weak European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) also exist. Hence, change is fundamental in order to underpin a more capable, effective and visible Common Security and Defence Policy.
Given Europe's financial crisis and the subsequent economic and social unrest of its citizens, it seems unrealistic to envisage a more structured, shared and effective EU foreign and security policy without tackling the continent's internal issues. Completing the single market is a priority for the EU. In addition, a common energy policy is urgently needed.
Regarding the refugee crisis, it is vital that the EU adopts a common asylum and refugee policy to be implemented by a European institution. This would ensure that the Member States assume their responsibilities on a joint, proportionate and mutually supportive basis. It is unacceptable that today the European strategy is mainly based on Turkey's willingness to stop refugees crossing their borders. That is not enough and it is certainly not a solution. The CFSP should also become more democratic by involving the European organised civil society in setting and implementing its objectives and priorities.
The EU needs to promote a multilateral rules-based order, striving for a strong UN as the bedrock of this order and develop globally coordinated actions, including international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors. Last but not least, the transatlantic relation remains irreplaceable; although different from 2003. At the time, the Bush administration, driven mostly by the shock of the 9/11 events, followed a, with us or against us policy, distancing friends and partners. On the contrary, the Obama administration tried to remediate America's unpopularity that resulted from the Iraqi disaster, betting more on a soft, diplomatic and multilateral external policy stance. Obama's foreign policy doctrine was based on a gradual retrenchment from the Middle East and a refocus on the Asia-Pacific region. Events in Ukraine, though, and the military actions of Russia have served to re-engage the US in Europe. However, the EU and the US view differently many security issues, for instance, whether to arm the Ukrainian military and the extent to which military action in the Middle East might be useful. Thus, a fundamental reassessment of the way in which the EU and the United States shall work together is a key to Europe's future global strategy too.
The New Global Security Strategy
On July 2016, the European Council in Brussels adopted the brand-new Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. 4 The document reveals that the EU has understood its urgent geopolitical perils. In reality, it is a cautious in language document, which recognizes the importance of union, but proclaims only further cooperation; not further integration among the European partners.
"Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead". This is the main line of reasoning in the new document. On this basis, the "democracy promotion" language has vanished. This is not because democracy is no longer necessary, but because promoting it should be a part of a principled policy rather than an arrogant mission .
Furthermore, the document contains a large number of concrete political proposals. However, as those proposals are not defined in detail they can difficulty guarantee Member State's action. As far as the ENP is concerned, there are two key points that define the EU's future approach to its immediate surroundings: resilience, based on the ability and willingness of the neighbour states and societies to reform and a tailored approach for each case/state. The document shows also a real and clear commitment to multilateral institutions and international law.
On the other hand, the document seems reluctant in: setting a transformative agenda in its neighbourhood, establishing a well-defined leadership team, funding and equipping the EEAS, creating a less bureaucratic decision-making framework and guaranteeing its "strategic autonomy", its capacity to be responsible for its own security.
In short, Federica Mogherini has said what is necessary to be done for a more secure Europe. However, what we really need in Europe today is the vehicle to get there. We need a stronger and a more efficient political, institutional and military basis.
Conclusion
The European Security Strategy may not have been able to solve the EU's strategic problems nor the transatlantic relationship faults. It has been, however, an important step in the slow process towards the EU's conceptual growth as an international actor. Indeed, for the first time, the European Union defined clear objectives for advancing its own security interests based on its common values of respect for liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.
In practise, though, it has been difficult to implement a coherent and united European security policy. Reviewing the 2003-2016 period one can see that general declarations and aspirations did not avoid Europe's security deterioration. The Arab Spring, the Russian military adventurisms, terrorism, the rise of the Islamic state and European jihadists and the current refugee crisis all revealed European security flaws. In addition, the 2008 financial crisis and the social turmoil it produced, as well as the rise of the nationalistic parties in Europe, have all made the implementation of a common strategy even more difficult to achieve.
The new Global Security Strategy promises that principled pragmatism will guide EU's external action in the years ahead. The new document declares further cooperation; not further integration among the European partners. However, what the European Union really needs is a genuine transformative agenda that promotes further unity and integration among its Member States. This new transformative agenda must include a well-defined leadership, a less bureaucratic decision-making framework, increased European military capabilities, a common asylum and refugee policy, full use of the tools provided for by the Treaties, and a well funded and equipped EEAS. It is also fundamental that the EU continues to promote a multilateral rules-based order and a dynamic transatlantic alliance. And Blair's doctrine of the international community can serve as a guide on what to avoid and what to take on next time in Europe's future adventurisms.
Member States need to define common interests and unite around common values more than ever before. Today, Europeans are called to declare the exact same thing as Schuman did 66 years ago: World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it (European Union 1950).
